

**AFR/AA/DRC**

# **R4 Report--FY 1999**

**March 4, 1997**

## **PART I. OVERVIEW OF PERFORMANCE**

### **A. Overview**

The Africa Bureau's Disaster Response Coordination Staff (AA/AFR/DRC) was established through the AFR reorganization of June 1, 1994. This action was taken in response to a variety of factors, including an awareness that the proliferation of natural disasters and complex emergencies in Africa required the establishment of an entity within the Africa Bureau for managing humanitarian assistance operational activities and staff functions. AFR senior management determined that there was a need to strengthen inter-bureau as well as interagency collaboration, monitoring and reporting on these activities. In addition, there was a concern that issues regarding relationships between humanitarian assistance and development programs required more systematic planning, review, and analysis.

The priority accorded crisis prevention and response by the Administration and the Agency, as well as an expectation that these requirements will exist in Africa over the long-term, have reinforced the need for an entity encompassing DRC's functions.

DRC has the lead responsibility within AFR for coordinating Bureau responses to humanitarian assistance requirements in sub-Saharan Africa. DRC serves as the primary point of contact for AFR for humanitarian assistance activities with BHR, the Global Bureau, Department of State, other USG agencies, and the NGO/PVO community. These activities include natural disaster early warning and response; conflict prevention and resolution; demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; refugee resettlement; PVO/NGO liaison; and miscellaneous functions.

DRC's mandate also includes support to missions for humanitarian response -- from emergency relief and rehabilitation to reconstruction and recovery -- and for long-term prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities linked to traditional development assistance.

In this regard, DRC also plays an operational role by managing and implementing two of the Bureau's largest regional projects, the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) and Africa Emergency Locust/Grasshopper Assistance (AELGA). These projects are focused on early warning, rapid response and prevention/mitigation as a means of avoiding or reducing the potential impact of disasters. In July 1996, DRC was tasked to manage a grant for conflict resolution. A Special Objective (SPO) for this activity was approved and entered in the NMS in August 1996. DRC also added another SPO to close out an unliquidated obligation. (The SO will be deleted when this is done).

Although DRC plays a policy and coordination role in the Africa Bureau for humanitarian assistance, it is submitting this R4 report because it is also an operating unit which directly manages the FEWS and AELGA activities.

As an operating unit, DRC prepared a strategy that was reviewed by AFR in March 1995. While the strategy was never formally approved, in June 1995 DRC submitted its 1997 Action Plan using the two goals and two strategic objectives (SOs) proposed in the strategy. This R4 also utilizes the same two strategic objectives proposed in the draft strategy, but notes that they are not within DRC's manageable interest. In addition, while the February 1996 Management Contract for the Operating Units in the Africa Bureau listed only one of DRC's Strategic Objectives, this R4 reports on both SOs because they were originally identified in the March 1995 Strategic Plan and the SPO created in August 1996. DRC will hold a parameters meeting in March 1997 and will revise its strategy to conform more closely with Agency objectives and reengineering principles.

## **B. Factors Affecting Performance**

None.

## **PART II. PROGRESS TOWARD OBJECTIVES**

### **A. Strategic Objective No 1**

#### **1. Performance Analysis**

**An improved use of USAID resources to prevent, mitigate, and respond to humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa.**

The following indicators are more precise versions of those proposed in the DRC draft strategic plan:

- " Reduction in the ratio of requested food aid to aggregate food deficits during potential food emergencies;
- " Improvements in responses to food emergencies, caused by drought and other natural factors, due to information and analysis provided by FEWS;
- " Improvements in responses to chronic food deficits through information and analysis provided by FEWS; and
- " Improvement in host country capacity to detect and mitigate locust and grasshopper outbreaks, without significant external assistance.

This Strategic Objective supports Agency Goal 5: "Lives Saved, Suffering Reduced and Development Potential Reinforced," and

pertains directly to Agency Strategic Objectives 5.1, "Prevention: the Potential Impact of Humanitarian Crises Reduced" and 5.2, "Relief: Urgent Needs Met in Crises Situations."

Activities under DRC's SO 1 reflect Agency program approaches for warning of impending disasters; identifying the potential impact of natural and complex disasters for at-risk populations; and coordination with other donors, regional and international organizations, and PVOs/NGOs.

All activities of the FEWS project and the majority of the activities of the AELGA Project are captured under this strategic objective.

Over the course of the past year, progress was made by the FEWS project toward achieving the first strategic objective. The quality and timeliness of FEWS information and analysis of potential drought and related food security issues have steadily improved. In addition, dissemination of information has been enhanced (see the example below). The combination of greater lead time and better information dissemination has given decision-makers more flexibility to respond to food security problems.

Progress is difficult to measure for crisis prevention, however. The indicators listed above are more qualitative than quantitative. Attempts will be made during the strategy review process to develop indicators that measure results more directly. For an activity like FEWS, traditional measures of performance and data gathering are not readily applicable. FEWS is designed to provide information to decision-makers, both USG and host country, which they in turn use to make more well-informed decisions.

Accurate measurement of results is further complicated by the nature of drought prevention and mitigation. During 1995, southern Africa suffered from a major drought, so data and examples of improved responses were easily identified. In 1996, on the other hand, no major food emergencies occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. Given the absence of an obvious emergency, anecdotal evidence must be used to illustrate progress achieved.

Although no major disasters were declared in 1996, problems were identified by FEWS in the western Sahel and in east Africa that became serious in early FY 1997. More complete results will therefore be captured in next year's R4. For the purpose of this year's reporting, however, it is important to highlight the fact that FEWS began tracking the problems as soon as they became apparent. This initiated a process in Washington and the field whereby key decision-makers were apprised early of potential problems. Throughout the course of the year, regular updates were published, meetings were convened and information provided in a manner that allowed AFR, BHR and Mission staff to

stay abreast of emerging crises and to plan appropriate responses. In the case of the western Sahel, where disaster declarations for drought were made in late 1996 and early 1997, FEWS first alerted USAID and other interested parties in the international community to a major disruption in the rainfall pattern in July. While a direct causal relationship is impossible to establish for 1996, due to the absence of a FY 1996 USG response, we believe that the process described above indicates clear evidence of FEWS impact.

Moreover, customer feedback on FEWS products has been excellent.

The FEWS Bulletin is published on a monthly basis, providing an excellent synopsis of current food security conditions in Africa. FEWS has also developed complementary products in response to customer demand, including field-based publications for Missions, an executive summary of potential problem areas (the WATCH), an internet version of its bulletin and a more frequently published Update available via the USAID Intranet home page. The breadth, depth and overall quality of these products have improved the decision-making process. In addition, FEWS published a ground-breaking analysis of the long-term food security issues which underlie the crisis in the Great Lakes.

AELGA emergency assistance has been critical in providing rapid response for Mauritania and Mozambique in 1996 to control locust outbreaks. Support was also provided to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Mali for monitoring and controlling locust and grasshopper outbreaks. These efforts, in cooperation with other donors, have helped reduce the likelihood of plague development in western and southern Africa.

The building of indigenous African institutional capacity is a critical long-term goal of the AELGA activity. This is accomplished through the implementation of highly specific, targeted regional and country-specific training programs which reinforce host country skills to monitor and report on emergency pests, and to control them using the most advanced, environmentally sound techniques. Much of USAID's assistance in controlling emergency outbreak pests involves providing U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)-approved pesticides; safety and communication equipment; support for survey, monitoring and control; and technical assistance.

In Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Botswana, training courses were planned and implemented by Ministries of Agriculture (MOA) working with AELGA support. In each country AELGA encouraged a high degree of inter-institutional cooperation.

Mauritania is an example of AELGA's collaborative approach to training. Nine intermediate customers and stakeholders including the Ministry of Rural Development and Environment, the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. Peace Corps, the German Technical Assistance group (GTZ), the Moroccan National Locust Control

Center, Force Maghrebine d'Intervention (the North Africa Regional Locust Control Group), the United Nations FAO, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the British Natural Resources Institute. The last three stakeholders provided essential training materials. The Mauritians applied this training and efficiently and effectively controlled the 1996 desert locust outbreaks.

The MOAs in Eritrea and Ethiopia took the initiative to produce their own locust and grasshopper training manuals, each over 100 pages in length, in their local languages. These positive results stem from AELGA's past in-country training efforts. This is a positive result of project training and focus on institution building.

AELGA staff also produced a detailed training needs assessment to better plan and target its current and future training activities. This assessment was based on historical information of past disaster declarations and USAID funds spent to manage locust and grasshopper emergencies.

There are three constraints, however, that have impeded progress of this SO: weak African regional institutions for control of emergency pests, armed conflicts in the Sudan, Somalia, and in northern Mali and Niger, and the presence of land mines in key remote locust breeding areas in Eritrea, Mauritania and Mozambique that have hampered surveying.

## **2. Expected Progress through FY 1999 and Management Actions**

FEWS will continue to emphasize the analysis and timely dissemination of quality information throughout sub-Saharan Africa. It will rely upon its network of FEWS field staff, working with USAID missions and local and international partners, to develop increasingly effective and timely information sources for preventing severe hunger, malnutrition and starvation.

FEWS will also continue to improve its working relationships with the FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System and other international organizations. FEWS will seek to better integrate on-the-ground information about agricultural production, markets, and vulnerable groups with international crop assessments. Since these assessments form the basis for food aid decisions made by the US and other donors, this should lead not only to improved factual reporting and analysis, but also to a consensus on targeting of food aid. FEWS will also continue to emphasize the development of regional and local institutional capacity in ways that strengthen relationships between early warning/effective drought response and famine prevention. The building of indigenous African institutional capacity is a critical long-term objective. This capacity-building supports achievement of USAID development goals for improving food security throughout Africa. Finally, it should

also reduce the frequency and size of host country requests for food aid during periods of scarcity.

Over the past year, FEWS has also intensified its coverage within areas affected by conflict, most notably in the Great Lakes region (i.e., Rwanda, Zaire, and Uganda). FEWS is exploring ways to provide information about highly complex food supply and related problems in Somalia to provide practical input for decisions affecting both relief and development.

SO 1 includes pest control-related activities consistent with the Agency objectives for crisis prevention and mitigation, and for the transition from humanitarian to development assistance.

Activities for FY 1998 and FY 1999 will fall into three categories: pest surveys and information sharing with decisions makers, training of host country nationals at all levels, and contingency funding for emergency pest outbreaks that cannot be controlled by the host country.

For FY 98 and FY 99 there are three factors that likely will enhance AELGA's activities: strong collaboration with stakeholders (the FAO and other donors), the initiation of FAO's Emergency Prevention System (EMPRES), and the use of African institutions to implement AELGA activities. AELGA's linkages with these groups and reliance upon them for cost-sharing will enhance the chances of achieving results more rapidly and in a cost-conscious manner for 1998 and 1999.

All of the MOAs with which AELGA works will be encouraged to produce their own emergency pest management training materials following the examples set in Eritrea and Ethiopia. They will also begin to produce their program monitoring and evaluation tools. This will permit the MOAs to take greater control of local pest management problems.

Host countries will improve their survey and reporting of emergency pest outbreaks. Information-sharing with the FAO will improve as will the quality and timeliness of host country reporting. The end result will be more rapid intervention by host countries and regional stakeholders for the management of locust and grasshopper problems.

## **B. Strategic Objective No. 2**

### **1. Performance Analysis**

**Improved environmentally-safe approaches to prevent and mitigate agricultural pest crises adopted by host countries, regional institutions, and international organizations in sub-Saharan Africa.**

This Strategic Objective supports Agency Goal 4: "Environment Managed for Long-Term Sustainability," and pertains to Agency

Objective 4.5 "Sustainable Natural Resource Management" through the use of pest management and funding of biocontrol research for sustainable agriculture production. DRC's SO 2 also relates to reduced pollution of soil and water through proper pesticide application and pesticide disposal.

Biological pesticides for control of locusts and grasshoppers were brought closer to becoming a reality in 1996. Biological pesticides will ultimately replace the use of synthetic chemical pesticides in strategic locust and grasshopper breeding areas in the future. Activities that contribute toward this SO are on-going in Madagascar and Eritrea, two areas that are susceptible to severe locust outbreaks.

In Madagascar, large scale field trials concluded that promising pathogens were as effective in controlling locusts with the same mortality rates as chemical pesticides. But unlike synthetic chemical pesticides, biopesticides are safe to humans and the environment. Other tests demonstrated that the biopesticides can be produced and formulated locally. These tests were planned and implemented by the MOA with the assistance of Montana State University (MSU).

Capacity-building has been supported by two highly technical training courses attended by researchers, scientists, and technical staff from 14 African countries. Results from AELGA's host country capacity building have been demonstrated by Malagasy scientists who have implemented biological control training, large scale field tests, various laboratory tests, development and use of local materials for large scale spore production, and proper maintenance of locust colonies for experimental use.

In Eritrea, the MOA collaborated with MSU to establish biological control research facilities and a locust rearing unit. Other AELGA sponsored activities included training on biological control experimental techniques, surveying for more potent insect pathogens, and conducting trials using newly found pathogens. In 1996, 44 new strains of fungi were identified and tested, some being very effective in killing locusts under laboratory conditions.

A unique AELGA initiative, known as "pesticide triangulation" has been successful again this year, e.g., 10,000 liters of dated, but still viable pesticides were donated by the Government of Zimbabwe to Mozambique. AELGA paid the transportation cost. The value of the fenitrothion donated by Zimbabwe for Mozambique is \$109,300. The amount of pesticide was enough to treat 13,333 hectares. Tunisia and Libya donated 40,600 liters of pesticide for use on approximately 40,600 hectares in Mauritania with the value of \$270,100. As a direct result of triangulation, two countries reduced their excess stocks of pesticides, thus eliminating the need for eventual pesticide disposal. Moreover, the donation assisted Mozambique



and Mauritania efforts to control locusts, and saved them \$379,400 in foreign exchange.

## **2. Expected Progress through FY 1999 and Management Actions**

A competitive, five-year grant program will be initiated in 1997 that will begin to show results in 1999. It is expected that this SO will achieve its targets as presented in the 1997 CP, i.e., "biological pesticides used on locust and grasshoppers by African nations." These new pesticides will begin to replace synthetic chemical pesticides as the environmental choice in prime locust and grasshopper breeding areas.

Sub-Saharan African countries will continue to properly dispose of obsolete and dangerous pesticides. AELGA will continue to provide assistance and share costs to leverage other donor funding. In addition, the pesticide triangulation activity will continue to be implemented by the FAO. This will further diminish the likelihood of future disposal problems. Improvements will also be made in the use of safety equipment and health monitoring associated with the use of EPA-approved pesticides.

## **C. Special Objective: Conflict Resolution: Searching for Common Ground in Africa**

### **1. Performance Analysis**

Conflict prevention and resolution will be promoted through a 13-part television magazine and radio series to be developed, filmed and aired in Africa. It will disseminate concepts for conflict prevention and resolution to a broad African audience.

It will explore how African people and governments try to resolve conflicts. The results will be a better understanding on how Africans in six countries have managed to resolve disputes without resorting to armed conflict. The critical assumption of the SPO is that this information will be a teaching tool to help audiences resolve conflicts and differences.

This activity will utilize television and radio, two of the most cost-effective tools available for pursuing political, economic, and human development to promote common understanding. In addition, the video tapes will be used as teaching tools by local and international private and voluntary organizations (PVOs). The programs will tell the stories of people involved in past disputes and how they used conflict resolution techniques to resolve differences. The video tapes will be repackaged for radio broadcast by African broadcasting stations as well as by the Voice of America.

This SPO was originally established in August, 1996; however, because of Congressional inquiries, the hold on the

Congressional Notification was not lifted until December and the activity did not commence until late December.

## **2. Expected Progress Through FY 1999 and Management Actions**

The activity began and will terminate in FY 1997. The television and radio series of 13 half-hour magazine formatted programs will be aired by African television and radio stations in up to 10 African nations. The videos will also serve as teaching tools and outreach materials for indigenous and international PVOs for conflict resolution activities. Both video and audio tapes will be provided to USIA for dissemination through Worldnet and the Voice of America. USIA has pledged to assist the grantee to estimate the size of the viewing and listening audience and to implement low-cost surveys to measure impact of the series.

## **PART III. STATUS OF THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT**

The Management Contract with DRC is based on DRC's 1997 Action Plan, which was developed in concert with a draft strategic plan in March, 1995. In FY 1997, DRC will hold its strategy parameters meeting in March and present its strategy for review in June of this year.

## **PART IV. RESOURCE REQUEST**

### **1. Financial Plan**

For the purposes of this Resource Request and the FY97 CP, DRC's funds are requested under the Agency's Environment Goal (see USAID Table II). Under the New Management System, however, DRC plans to report its SOs with the Agency's Humanitarian Assistance goal.

- A. USAID Table I: FY 99 Request by Program  
r4drc97.wk4
- B. USAID Table II: Request By SO  
sodrc97.wk4

### **2. Prioritization of Objectives**

The rank order of objectives is as follows:

- 1. Strategic Objective 1: An improved use of USAID resources to prevent, mitigate, and respond to humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa.
- 2. Strategic Objective 2: Improved environmentally-safe approaches to prevent and mitigate agricultural pest crises adopted by host countries, regional institutions, and international organizations in sub-Saharan Africa.

It is difficult to rank these objectives based on performance, since both are doing well. However, of the two, Strategic Objective 1 is more relevant to the performance of AFR/DRC's operational functions. The information resources provided under SO 1 constitute a key component of the DRC's analytical capabilities for crisis prevention and response.

### **3. Linkage of Field Support, Non-emergency Title II and Title III**

Not applicable.

### **4. Workforce and OE**

AA/AFR/DRC has a small core staff of six persons: three OE-funded and three program-funded professionals. DRC's responsibilities could be increased for coordination of crisis and transitional program activities if Agency and Africa Bureau management adopt reforms that have been proposed for implementation of such programs. An increase in DRC's responsibilities would have workforce implications.

## **5. Environmental Compliance**

DRC has no issues to report. For the record, pesticide purchase and application and research into biological pesticides are all conducted within the guidance of Supplemental Environmental Assessments that have prior approval by the Africa Bureau's Environmental Officer.

Regarding DRC's Special Objective for conflict resolution, an Initial Environmental Examination was approved based on a categorical exclusion as per 216.2(c)(1)(i).